【 SUIBE思源金融讲坛——学术报告第45期 】:Inside the 'Black Box' of Private In-House Meetings: Implications for Fair Disclosure and Insider Trading Regulation

pubdate:2017-06-14views:350

上海对外经贸大学思源金融讲坛

——学术报告第45

题目:Inside the 'Black Box' of Private In-House Meetings: Implications for Fair

Disclosure and Insider Trading Regulation

报告人:唐松莲, 华东理工大学商学院

时间2017616日下午1: 30 -3: 30

地点:博萃楼4楼阳光房

论文:学院内网

论文摘要

While corporate private in-house meetings between investors and management are common across the world, there are generally no detailed reporting requirements for these meetings. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange in China is an exception and thus provides a unique opportunity to look inside the ‘black box’ to examine the structure and consequences of private in-house meetings. We develop a unique large-scale hand-collected dataset by accessing over 17,000 private meeting reports over 2012-2014 and use reported meeting details to examine the consequences of private in-house meetings. We find that, on average: (i) the stock market anticipates positive news in these private meetings as there is a significant stock price run-up starting about 30 days before the meeting date, (ii) the market reacts strongly and positively around these meeting dates, and (iii) the market reacts again around the subsequent public disclosure of the meeting notes. Further, we find that company insiders engage in significant trading activities around these meeting dates, selling over $12 billion USD of their shares – almost 62% of the total value of all insider trades for Shenzhen-listed firms in our sample period. Most importantly, it appears that company insiders are able to time their transactions: they tend to sell more shares before negative news disclosures but hold off selling when there is positive news to be disclosed in the meeting. Overall, our results suggest that firms disclose material non-public information during these private meetings, and that at least some meeting participants and company insiders trade on this information before it is publicly available. Finally, it appears that disclosure of private meeting details can be beneficial for market participants who are unable to attend such meetings. We discuss implications of these findings for disclosure requirements in the US.

  

报告人简介

唐松莲,华东理工大学商学院副教授、硕士生导师,会计学系副主任,研究领域包括市场中介行为、信息披露、风险投资等,已在《管理世界》、《南开管理评论》等刊物发表论文多篇,工作论文曾在2016 China Finance Review international conference 荣获Emerad Best Paper2016 Auckland Finance Meetings 荣获2016 CFA institute Asia-Pacific Capital Markets Research Award;主持完成国家自然科学基金项目“机构投资者禀赋差异对其选股偏好及作用于公司效应的影响研究——来自后股改时期的证据”,目前正在主持国家自然科学基金面上项目“管理层利益诉求与公司策略性信息披露:基于实地调研视角研究”。


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