| 摘要: |
| 系统重要性金融机构(SIFIs)倒闭产生的巨大负外部性使得各国在危机处置中更倾向于救助而非任其倒闭，但“太大而不能倒”又会引发道德风险，扭曲公平竞争。国际组织就SIFIs的危机处置提出一系列解决方案及建议，其中自救安排中的或有资本计划作为一项重要的资本工具而广受关注。或有资本不仅具有预防和早期救助、自救之功效，还能有效改善公司治理结构，与《巴塞尔协议II》的三大支柱原则完美契合。但或有资本亦存在不确定性较大、价格变动及成本效用减损等问题，需要结合我国具体的金融市场环境论证、设计、草拟相关规则及配套制度，需要在发行规模、发行程序、转化设计和转化条件等方面谨慎论证、不断完善。 |
| 关键词: 或有资本 大而不倒 系统重要性金融机构 自救安排 |
| DOI： |
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| 基金项目:司法部专项课题“系统重要性金融机构重整与有序清算法律制度研究”(项目编号:13SFB5036)。 |
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| Research on Contingent Capital of Systemically Important Financial Institutions |
| ZHANG Ji-hong |
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| Abstract: |
| Given the huge negative externalities resulting in bankruptcy of SIFIs, countries are more inclined to bailout not to leave them to fail. But “too big to fail”may trigger moral hazard and distort fair competition. International organizations have put forward a series of solutions and suggestions about crisis intervention of SIFIs, among which contingent capital project in bail-in arrangement is grabbing great attention as an important capital instrument. Contingent capital doesn’t only have the function of prevention, early rescue and bail-in, but also effectively improves corporate governance structure and perfectly accords with the three pillar principles of Basel Accords II. However, there are also great uncertainty, price fluctuation, cost-effectiveness impairment and other problems in contingent capital. It needs combination with relative specific rules to design and establish the contingent capital system including issuing size, issuing procedure, design and transformation conditions that is fit for China’s financial market environment. |
| Key words: contingent capital too big to fail SIFI bail-in arrangement |
